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AZ-DBG-01: MAA attests the VM as non-debuggable and Azure-compliant

Property Value
Severity critical
Platform Azure confidential VMs
Lifecycle stage attest
Trust boundary attestation
Assurance report-derived
Mode Passive: read-only cloud API calls.

What a failure enables

  • Workload keys released to an attacker-controlled VM

How to fix

  • Redeploy from an Azure confidential VM image with a non-debug guest policy; investigate why MAA flags it.
  • Use an MAA token issued by Microsoft's shared regional provider or your own provider (pass it with --azure-attestation-provider), captured on the VM.
  • Capture a fresh MAA token on the VM.

After the fix, scan again: the check should report PASS.

Scan inputs

The untrust scan options this check reads:

Option Description
--azure-approved-attestation-authority MAA hosts you approve as release-policy authorities besides Microsoft's shared providers and --azure-attestation-provider (comma separated).
--azure-attestation-provider MAA provider name (in the resource group) or resource ID.
--azure-attestation-token MAA token (JWT) captured inside the VM.
--azure-resource-group Resource group of the VM.
--azure-subscription Subscription ID.
--azure-vm Confidential VM name.

Permissions

The cloud API calls this check makes, read from the scanner's source:

Cloud API call Permission Access
Azure arm.attestation_provider (GET attestation provider) Microsoft.Attestation/attestationProviders/read read
Azure arm.vm (GET virtual machine) Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read read

See Required permissions for every check on this platform.

Generated from untrust 1.3.0 (commit 7ef462d9a0c3).